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Tottenham's Struggles: Why De Zerbi's Spurs Can't Score

Four games into the season and the Premier League table carries an awkward little statistic: only two clubs are still waiting for their first goal. Coventry City… and Tottenham Hotspur.

That would be jarring in any season. It is remarkable in this one. Spurs have thrown around roughly £320m on new players, most of it on attackers. Yet the scoreboard refuses to move.

So what is going on with Roberto De Zerbi’s Tottenham?

De Zerbi’s idea, Tottenham’s reality

The Premier League De Zerbi has returned to is not the one he left when he walked away from Brighton in 2024. The pace is different, the pressing patterns have evolved, and yet his core ideas are instantly recognisable.

His teams invite pressure. They slow the game down, roll the ball backwards, almost daring opponents to jump. When the trap is sprung and the press comes, they accelerate, hitting direct passes or carrying the ball forcefully into the gaps left behind.

He summed it up neatly at a coaching seminar in 2020: “The stronger the pressure of the opponent, the more vertical [our] action becomes. [The fewer opponents behind], the easier it becomes to go and score.”

We’ve already seen Tottenham reach those promising moments: forwards isolated against fewer defenders, big spaces opening up in advanced areas. The build-up often looks like it’s working.

Turning that into goals is another story.

The 2-3-2-3 and the moving parts

In possession, Spurs’ structure can look fluid to the point of messy, but the underlying pattern is usually a 2-3-2-3.

Rodrigo Bentancur holds the base in front of the two centre-backs. That trio tends to stay put, providing the platform. Ahead of them, the picture shifts constantly: wingers, full-backs and central midfielders rotate, swapping zones to keep the overall shape intact.

Lose your position, fill another. Someone vacates a lane, someone else slides in. That’s the idea.

On top of this positional framework, De Zerbi layers his principles. Much of it echoes what he built at Marseille between 2024 and 2026, where his side averaged 2.3 goals per game. The system has proven it can generate chances and finish them. In north London, the machine is still being assembled.

There are flashes. But the joins are visible.

Playing through the middle – and why it matters

De Zerbi wants his teams to play through the centre, not skirt around it.

That central focus triggers two key effects. When Spurs’ centre-backs have the ball and look inside, opposition forwards and midfielders push up to close them down. That creates pockets between the lines for Tottenham’s attacking midfielders.

At the same time, that gravitational pull towards the middle can drag defenders infield, freeing the flanks for Spurs’ direct wingers to attack in space.

For it to work, the players receiving those central passes must be happy operating under pressure, often with opponents at their back and little room to turn. Not everyone is.

Sandro Tonali, for instance, is more dangerous when he can drive forward into open grass. De Zerbi has responded by rotating him with Archie Gray, who starts at right-back but steps inside. It’s not Gray’s natural role, yet the 20-year-old has coped in tight spaces and seems to grasp what his manager wants.

The return of James Maddison, back from a shoulder injury for last Tuesday’s Carabao Cup tie at Liverpool, could be pivotal. Maddison is built for those pockets between the lines. If he settles quickly, Spurs should find it easier to reach dangerous zones more often.

But this isn’t just about individual flair. It’s about habits. Under Thomas Frank at the start of last season, Tottenham largely ignored the middle third in build-up, preferring to work down the flanks to reduce the risk of costly turnovers.

De Zerbi is asking them to do almost the opposite: take the ball into crowded central areas, trust their technique and decision-making, and live with the risk. That kind of bravery does not appear overnight.

The pass that never comes

For all the talk of structure and philosophy, Tottenham’s biggest problem right now is simple: the final ball.

Spurs regularly break beyond the opposition midfield once they’ve lured the press and punched through it. They reach promising positions. Then the move stalls.

Three things need to align in those moments: the passer must see the best option, the movement ahead of the ball must be sharp, and the execution has to match the idea. Tottenham are falling down most often on the first part.

Too many times, players either don’t spot the through ball or choose the safer option instead.

Omar Marmoush has made intelligent runs in behind, again and again. The passes have not always followed. Gray has tried to slide balls down the line, but Spurs have been far less willing to attempt those riskier, more central through passes.

The impending influence of Pedro Porro could change that. For Spain, on their way to the World Cup this summer, he often played in more central zones and showed how naturally he can create from there. If he brings that same instinct back into De Zerbi’s system, Tottenham should start to carve out clearer chances.

That’s exactly what De Zerbi’s forwards enjoyed at Marseille.

Learning the runs

While Porro plays catch-up on fitness and rhythm, others are still learning the choreography.

At Marseille, De Zerbi’s attacking pattern was clear: wide forwards on the last line making diagonal runs inside, found by team-mates willing to punch vertical passes between defenders. It became a reliable route to goal.

Igor Paixao’s strike in a 2-2 draw with Toulouse last season captured that blueprint perfectly – direct pass, well-timed diagonal movement, ruthless finish.

There were hints of similar patterns at Anfield in the Carabao Cup. Destiny Udogie repeatedly hit smart positions on the left as the game stretched. Andy Robertson has impressed for Spurs this season, but Udogie’s power and timing let him exploit the open spaces once Liverpool’s shape loosened.

Those moves dragged Tottenham into good crossing areas against a defence scrambling to recover. Again, the platform was there. The final touch was not.

The last piece: finishing the move

When an attacking side suddenly accelerates, defenders tend to retreat in a hurry, collapsing towards their own box. That panicked drop leaves a different type of space: zones just in front of the back line, ideal for late-arriving midfielders or strikers who peel off and then step into the gap.

Marmoush has tried to exploit that, dropping off to receive cut-backs or low crosses. The connection hasn’t always been there.

Some of this is chemistry. Players still learning each other’s runs. Some of it is technical. Savio, a left-footed right winger, is far more comfortable driving to the byline than pulling the ball back on his weaker foot. On the opposite side, the left-footed Udogie and Robertson have produced clearer chances with their deliveries.

At Marseille, the picture was more balanced: both the right winger and right full-back were happy cutting the ball back on their stronger right foot. Those crosses were then attacked by Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang, whose movement in the box at 37 remained razor sharp.

That level of finishing quality and penalty-box craft made De Zerbi’s patterns look devastating.

Tottenham are not there yet. But they are not miles away either.

The structure is in place. The pressing traps work often enough. The rotations are starting to make sense. Many of Spurs’ attacks are one decision, one better-timed run, one cleaner cut-back away from becoming high-quality chances.

De Zerbi’s methods will not click perfectly overnight, and this squad does not yet boast the same ruthless edge Marseille enjoyed. But if Spurs can sharpen those small details – the courage to play the riskier pass, the confidence to receive under pressure, the precision of movement in the box – the goals should come.

The question is not whether this team can score under De Zerbi. It’s how long they can afford to wait before the table starts asking harder questions.